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Abstract
Popular capitalism has been widely recognized by contemporaries and historians
alike as an integral part of Thatcherism. The growth of the number of private
shareholders was a defining feature of the 1980s, one undoubtedly facilitated by
successive Conservative government policies such as privatization and deregu-
lation. However, historians have yet to fully explore the underlying drives and
mechanisms of Thatcherism in the realm of popular share ownership. This article
takes a small pressure group, the Wider Share Ownership Council (WSOC), as a
case study to demonstrate that Thatcherism entailed a set of institutional reforms
which favoured certain interests in the City, at the expense of the individual
consumer. The WSOC’s ideology was based on an ardent belief that wider share
ownership was the best way to create a nation of well-informed capitalists,
enfranchised in the economic life of the country and supportive of a free-market
system. However, loyalty to this agenda eventually served to alienate it from the
project of Thatcherism and certain financial institutions by the end of the 1980s.
Although relatively small, the Council calls into question current narratives of
the 1980s. Its alternative vision of wider share ownership demonstrates the
institutionally constructed nature of popular capitalism as a vehicle for
individual share ownership. Its institutional narrative also has implications for
how historians perceive consumer society in the 1980s. It suggests that the
consumer of financial services became increasingly inhibited by the range of
products on offer by a small but dominant group of financial conglomerates.
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It is possible that when historians look back at social change in the
late twentieth century, they will identify this widening and
increasingly popular basis of ownership or wealth-creating assets
as one of the most significant developments of the era.
The Wider Share Ownership Council, Report on Future Policy
(November 1987)1
Popular capitalism has been widely recognized by contemporaries
and historians alike as an integral part of Thatcherism.2 The growth of
the number of private shareholders was a defining feature of the 1980s,
one undoubtedly facilitated by successive Conservative Party policies
such as privatization and deregulation. However, historians have yet to
fully explore the underlying drives and mechanisms of Thatcherism in
the realm of popular share ownership.
This article takes a small pressure group, the Wider Share Ownership
Council (WSOC), as a case study to demonstrate that for the private
investor the 1980s were characterized by the defence of financial
capitalism, as opposed to the advancement of consumer capitalism.3
The apparent growth in individual investors was matched by an even
more marked movement of equities into institutional hands with the
result that the revolution in the financial services market did not
produce free market conditions in which the ‘consumer is ultimately
‘‘king’’’.4 Instead consumer choice in this domain was limited by the
institutional concerns of banks, pension funds, life assurance firms, unit
trusts, and so forth.
As Neil Rollings suggests, there is a great deal of consensus
regarding the ‘basic framework’ of the development of neoliberalism,
which has largely been characterized as the rise of the right.5 Histories
1 Material from the London School of Economics Library, London, Wider Share
Ownership Council Collection (hereafter, LSE, WSOC) is uncatalogued. As much detail as
possible is given but there are no available reference numbers. LSE, WSOC, Wider Share
Ownership Council, Report on Future Policy (November 1987), 1.
2 Thatcherism is used here as an analytical term to delineate the concurrence of a
series of economic, ideological and political conditions in Britain during the late-twentieth
century. The term should not be conflated with the Conservative Party and the
New Right. Rather it should refer to a range of institutions and actors which contributed
to the creation of an institutional structure geared towards the individualization
of responsibility in private life.
3 Here financial capitalism refers to the interests and control of large financial
institutions (predominantly pension funds, insurance companies, unit trusts and large
clearing and investment banks) over the UK equities market.
4 Edward Gardener, Barry Howcroft and Jonathan Williams, ‘The New Retail Banking
Revolution’, The Services Industry Journal, 19 (1999), 87.
5 Neil Rollings, ‘Cracks in the Post-War Keynesian Settlement? The Role of Organized
Business in Britain in the Rise of Neoliberalism before Margaret Thatcher’, Twentieth
Century British History, 24 (2013), 638; Keith Tribe, ‘Liberalism and Neoliberalism in
Britain, 1930–80’, in Philip Mirowski and Dieter Plehwe, eds, The Road from Mont Pe`lerin:
The Making of the Neoliberal Thought Collective (London, 2009); David Harvey, A Brief
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such as Daniel Stedman Jones’ Masters of the Universe take academic and
political groups as their focus and view neoliberalism either in the
abstract, or as ‘an intellectual and a political movement for concrete
social and economic change’.6 In the British case, the Conservative
Party and think tanks such as the Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA)
and the Centre for Policy Studies (CPS) have garnered most attention.
Analyses focus on their roles as vehicles for neoliberal ideology,
manifested in the policies and politics of Thatcherism.7 Academics have
thus tended to afford Thatcherism a certain ideological coherence, with
many taking the rhetoric of the Conservative Party as starting point for
investigation.8
Yet, as Robert Saunders indicates, Thatcherism was by no means a
fully formulated ideology, especially during the 1970s when it tended to
be explanatory rather than offering a definitive policy programme.9
Dolowitz et al. also argue that in addition to New Right ideology,
economic and political factors, and the position of powerful interests
were key drivers of Thatcherism.10 Restricting analyses of Thatcherism
to the ideology and rhetoric of the Conservative Party thus carries a
danger of excluding the activities and will of other institutions and
actors. Yet, such groups frequently provided the mechanisms for
Thatcherism, and in doing so, shaped the form that it took in practise.
So whilst it is no great revelation to argue that the intentions and
rhetorical promises of a political party do not always match reality as
policies and ideologies encounter the real world, that does not mean
that the evolution of popular capitalism at the hands of financial
institutions is of no consequence. This article considers the impact of
institutional struggle and competition over the individual investor on
History of Neoliberalism (Oxford, 2007); Dennis Kavanagh, Thatcherism and British Politics:
The End of Consensus? (2nd edn, Oxford, 1990).
6 Daniel Stedman Jones, Masters of the Universe: Hayek, Friedman, and the Birth of
Neoliberal Politics (Princeton, 2012), 331.
7 Andrew Denham and Mark Garnett, ‘‘What Works’? British Think Tanks and the
‘End of Ideology’’, The Political Quarterly, 77 (2006), 157–160; Andrew Denham and Mark
Garnett, ‘Influence without Responsibility? Think-Tanks in Britain’, Parliamentary Affairs,
52 (1999), 48–53; Monica Prasad, The Politics of Free Markets: The Rise of Neoliberal Economic
Policies in Britain, France, Germany, and the United States (Chicago, 2006), 154; Richard
Cockett, Thinking the Unthinkable: Think-Tanks and the Economic Counter-Revolution, 1931–
1983 (London, 1994).
8 E.H.H. Green, ‘Thatcherism: an Historical Perspective’, Transactions of the Royal
Historical Society, Sixth Series, 9 (1999); Jim Tomlinson, ‘Thrice Denied: ‘Declinism’ as a
Recurrent Theme in British History in the Long Twentieth Century’, Twentieth Century
British History, 20 (2009), 235; Colin Hay, ‘Chronicles of Death Foretold: The Winter of
Discontent and Construction of the Crisis of British Keynesianism’, Parliamentary Affairs,
63 (2000).
9 Robert Saunders, ‘‘Crisis? What Crisis?’ Thatcherism and the Seventies’, in Ben
Jackson and Robert Saunders, eds, Making Thatcher’s Britain (Cambridge, 2012), 26.
10 David Dolowitz et al, ‘Thatcherism and the 3 ‘Rs’: Radicalism, Realism and Rhetoric
in the Third Term of the Thatcher Government’, Parliamentary Affairs, 49 (1996), 467, 469.
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the trajectories of competing visions of popular capitalism, arguing that
in this domain Thatcherism entailed a set of institutional reforms that
favoured certain interests in the City.
Academics such as Kim Phillips-Fein, Ben Jackson, Neil Rollings and
Matthew Hilton have demonstrated that accounts of the neoliberal
‘counter-revolution’ cannot ignore the role of the business community.11
This is also true of the financial community. Links between neoliberalism
and the finance industry have not been left unexplored by academics.
There is a significant body of Foucauldian-inspired work that considers
the relationship between individual investors and ideas such as popular
capitalism, enterprise culture, risk and regulation.12 This has much to tell
us about how the language used by and applied to the financial services
industry has served to transform individuals ‘into particular kinds of
consuming subjects’.13 However, this body of work has less to say about
those factors that allowed particular discourses to become dominant at
the expense of others. By considering one failed institutionally backed
trajectory of wider share ownership, located in the WSOC, it becomes
clear that material factors were also at play.
Formed in 1958 as group intent on ‘spread[ing] enlightenment about
the processes of Saving and Investment’ the WSOC held at its core a
belief that wider share ownership was the best way to create a nation of
well-informed capitalists, enfranchised in the economic life of the
country. Its concern lay predominantly with employee share ownership
as a means of encouraging industrial democracy and efficiency.
Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, it became attuned to a series of
debates within the Conservative Party concerning the potential for
capital ownership to transform popular attitudes to the free-enterprise
11 Kim Phillips-Fein, Invisible Hands: the Making of the Conservative Movement from the
New Deal to Reagan (New York, 2009); Ben Jackson, ‘The Think-Tank Archipelago:
Thatcherism and Neo-liberalism’, in Jackson and Saunders, eds, Making Thatcher’s Britain;
Rollings, ‘Cracks in the Post-War Keynesian Settlement?’; Matthew Hilton, Prosperity for
all: Consumer Activism in an Era of Globalization (New York, 2009).
12 Damian Hodgson, Discourse, Discipline and the Subject: A Foucauldian analysis of the UK
financial services industry (Hampshire, 2000); Christopher Grey, ‘Suburban Subjects:
Financial Services and the New Right’, in David Knights and Tony Tinker, eds, Financial
Institutions and Social Transformations: International Studies of a Sector (Hampshire, 1997);
David Knights and Andrew Sturdy, ‘Marketing the Soul: From the Ideology of
Consumption to Consumer Subjectivity’, in Knights and Tinker, eds, Financial Institutions
and Social Transformations; David Knights, Andrew Sturdy and Glenn Morgan, ‘The
Consumer Rules? An Examination of the Rhetoric and ‘‘Reality’’ of Marketing in Financial
Services’, European Journal of Marketing, 28 (1994); Franc¸ois Ewald, ‘Insurance and Risk’, in
Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon and Peter Miller, eds, The Foucault Effect: Studies in
Governmentality (Chicago, 1991); Paul Langley, ‘The Making of Investor Subjects in Anglo-
American Pensions’, Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, 24 (2006); Paul Heelas,
‘Reforming the Self: Enterprise and the Characters of Thatcherism’, in Russell Keat and
Nicholas Abercrombie, eds, Enterprise Culture (London, 1991).
13 Knights and Sturdy, ‘Marketing the Soul’, 159.
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system.14 However, loyalty to its wider share ownership agenda meant
that the 1980s was marked by a waning coherence between the
activities of the Council, the Party and the designs of large financial
institutions.
The Council’s institutional trajectory mirrors many of the changes being
wrought by Thatcherism in the domain of personal finance more broadly.
Clearing banks, pension funds and unit trust companies capitalized
on political reform in order to gain a competitive edge in the provision
of services to the private investor, inserting themselves at the very heart of
capital acquisition. Individuals were encouraged to see capital as a form
of asset management to be carried out through increasingly complex
financial instruments. The Council and its competing model of popular
investment, meanwhile, were marginalized. The result was that
Thatcherism, seen as the outcome of this institutional struggle, failed to
endow the individual with a meaningful role in a ‘property-owning
democracy’. For the Council, it meant dissolution in 1992.
The analysis that follows is split into three main sections, the first of
which accounts for the Council’s ideology and particularly its concern
with employee share ownership. The second section explores the
Council’s activities competing for funds, influence and resources in the
City, demonstrating the institutional struggle over the private investor
that defined the course of wider share ownership in Britain. The final
section of this article discusses the WSOC’s disappointment in the failure
of its goal to materialize and its growing concerns with consumer
protection in the face of growing institutional investment at the expense
of the individual investor. This reflected wider problems concerning the
unequal distribution of financial competence and knowledge in society.15
Although relatively small, the WSOC calls into question current
narratives of this period. Its alternative vision of wider share ownership
and eventual alienation from Thatcherism and the financial service
industry demonstrates the institutionally constructed nature of popular
capitalism. It also uncovers alternative trajectories of popular capitalism
and consumer empowerment in this period.
Manufacturing Capitalists: The Ideology of the WSOC
From its founding in 1958, the WSOC saw its role largely in terms of
educating the British public and British business in capital ownership,
14 Matthew Francis, ‘Not Too Many Capitalists but Too Few: The Conservative Party
and the Property-Owning Democracy, 1945–70’, paper presented to the School of History
Modern Research Seminar (Leeds, 2013).
15 Haˆkan Johansson and Bjørn Hvinden, ‘Welfare Governance and the Remaking of
Citizenship’, in Janet Newman, ed., Remaking Governance: Peoples, Politics and the Public
Sphere (Bristol, 2005), 109–10.
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not merely to expand ownership, but in order to train the nation in the
practices of capitalism. In a discussion paper entitled The Crisis of
Capitalism in Britain and Corporate Governance it asserted that the best
way to ensure the survival of the capitalist system and allow it to
flourish was to ‘manufacture’ ‘new capitalists’, primarily through
spreading capital ownership.16 In particular, the Council’s vision of
wider share ownership was predicated on the creation of an informed,
knowledgeable and active base of private share-owners with experience
of direct ownership of capital.
This vision and the Council’s formative years were heavily
influenced by its founding members, a small group of city figures
and politicians. Its ambitions consequently largely reflected elite and
political attitudes towards wider share ownership in the mid-twentieth
century. The political make-up of the Council was predominantly
Conservative with notable members including Maurice Macmillan and
Sir Toby Low.17 Low was simultaneously a member of the Conservative
Party’s Policy Committee on Share Ownership which contained another
WSOC member, Edward du Cann. He would go on to become
Conservative Party Chairman in 1965 and his Unicorn Trust was
instrumental in revitalizing the unit trust industry in the late 1950s.
However, the existence of such strong links to the Conservatives should
not produce an understanding of the WSOC as merely an off-shoot of
the Party. It was formed on an all-party basis at Macmillan’s behest and
boasted a strong Liberal contingent.18 These individuals provided an
important moderation of what would otherwise have been, politically
speaking, an almost-entirely Conservative organization, and it is
necessary to acknowledge their input.
The number of Liberals in the WSOC’s ranks should not come as any
great surprise given liberalism’s traditional concern with the sanctity of
private property and individual liberty.19 Stuart White has pointed to
ongoing attempts by ‘revolutionary liberals’ to offer an alternative to
both capitalism and socialism based on a ‘liberty-promoting, dispersive
16 LSE, WSOC, The Wider Share Ownership Council, Discussion Paper: The Crisis of
Capitalism in Britain and Corporate Governance (undated, c.1975).
17 Low was a co-author of the Conservative pamphlet, Everyman a Capitalist (Bodleian
Library, Oxford, Conservative Party Archives (hereafter CPA), PUB 167/22, Conservative
Political Centre, Everyman a Capitalist: Some Proposals for the Small Saver in Industry,
201 (April 1956)).
18 Given that the WSOC consistently struggled to maintain Labour Party representation
on its committee, the influence of the Liberal and Conservative Parties are undoubtedly of
greater significance. Liberal Party members included M.P. Harry Ball-Wilson (who was
Chairman of the Institute of Management Services and involved in the Trade Union
movement), Lady Seear, Lord Falkland and Philip Goldenberg (a member of the CBI’s
London Regional Council between 1989 and 1995).
19 Alan Ryan, The Making of Modern Liberalism (Princeton, 2012), 23–4.
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approach to property’.20 In this the Liberal Party drew on the work of
WSOC founding member and Deputy Chairman, George Copeman,21
who addressed the Liberal Summer School in 1958, and whose ideas
were developed and popularized by another WSOC member and
Liberal MP, Richard Wainwright.22
As Fair and Hutcheson discuss, the solidifying of a Conservative
‘ideology’ throughout the twentieth century came largely as a result of
the inroads made by socialism (notably after election defeats in 1923
and 1929), and a fear that Conservatism was comparatively ideologic-
ally void. That the ‘threat of socialism continued to govern the course of
Conservative thought’ is demonstrated by Baldwin’s construction of an
‘anti-Socialist’ bloc in the inter-war years by appealing to floating voters
who had Liberal sentimentalities.23 As E.H.H. Green suggests, the
Conservative electoral revival of the early 1950s also relied on a strategy
of targeting (generally Liberal) floating voters.24 The WSOC inherited
these contemporary concerns. It understood socialism to be a realistic
threat to capitalism and saw the potential for common ground to be
found between Liberal and Conservative ideologies.
Although not entirely static, the Council’s executive committee was
fairly consistent throughout its life. The formative years of these
members, who had largely been born at the beginning of the century,
were thus significant. In particular, the WSOC’s vision of share
ownership betrayed an intellectual debt to the experiences of profit
sharing in Britain during the early twentieth century. As Derek
Matthews suggests, until the 1930s profit-sharing schemes were almost
exclusively implemented as a means of reducing industrial tension.25
Harvie Ramsay similarly argues that worker participation appears
cyclically, rising in periods when management authority is perceived to
be under threat.26 Support for such an analysis can be found in
government discussions concerning the potential of compulsory
20 Stuart White, ‘‘Revolutionary Liberalism’? The Philosophy and Politics of Ownership
in the Post-war Liberal Party’, British Politics, 4 (2009), 165.
21 Copeman completed his PhD at the London School of Economics on the relationship
between the distribution of ownership and human freedom. He credited Hayek’s
The Road to Serfdom (1944) as an inspiration for the formation of the WSOC
(LSE, WSOC, George Copeman, ‘Introduction,’ An Illustrated History of the Wider Share
Ownership Council, 1958-92: with special emphasis on the development of Employee Share
Ownership (unpublished), 1).
22 White, ‘‘Revolutionary liberalism’?’, 178.
23 John D. Fair and John A. Hutcheson, Jr, ‘British Conservatism in the Twentieth
Century: An Emerging Ideological Tradition’, Albion: A Quarterly Journal Concerned with
British Studies, 19 (Winter, 1987), 559; Green, ‘Thatcherism’, 24.
24 Fair and Hutcheson, Albion, 559; Green, ‘Thatcherism’, 24.
25 Derek Matthews, ‘The British Experience of Profit-Sharing’, The Economic History
Review, New Series, 42 (November 1989), 446.
26 Havie Ramsay, ‘Cycles of Control: Worker Participation in Sociological and Historical
Perspective’, Sociology, 11 (1977).
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profit-sharing, followed by a failed Tory campaign to gain tax assistance
to profit-sharing in the 1920s.27 It was in this period that Unionst MP
Noel Skelton’s original conception of a ‘property-owning democracy’
was borne. Skelton saw co-partnership and profit-sharing as a way to
distribute property more widely, and consequently improve industrial
relations as part of ‘a Conservative response to the social and political
challenges of the 1920s’.28 It is no surprise, therefore, that the WSOC’s
president, Lord Shawcross, praised the role that such schemes could
play in providing a mechanism for quelling worker discontent by
‘Killing the ‘‘us’’ and ‘‘them’’ syndrome before it kills us’.29
Employee share schemes were a focus of the Council’s wider share
ownership agenda from its founding, forming one of the Council’s two
main divisions.30 They were seen as the ideal way to introduce a simple yet
structured access point to share ownership which could provide the
necessary education in capitalism whilst also addressing problems of
industrial tension. This concern drew from the example of employee stock
ownership plans in America, with George Copeman citing their pioneer,
Louis Kelso, as an inspiration.31 Copeman asserted that employee shares
schemes encouraged efficiency in the workplace and discouraged
unionization by giving employees a direct say in company matters. He
understood employee share schemes as providing ‘a stake in the business,
not a change in control’.32 As such, popular capitalism, according to the
Council, could be achieved through such schemes in which, unlike
‘traditional capitalism’, ‘the great bulk of employees . . . participate in both
the income rewards and the capital rewards of success’.33 As Andrew
Pendleton suggests, employee share schemes developed on this basis
encourage individual remuneration as opposed to any attempt to reform
corporate governance.34 It was expected that shares would be owned by
individual employees, invested in the company’s fortunes due to an
individualistic concern with greater growth and profits. It is, perhaps, for
this reason that the Council had little to say on the matter of co-operatives
27 Matthews, ‘The British Experience of Profit-Sharing’, 442.
28 Matthew Francis, ‘A Crusade to Enfranchise the Many: Thatcherism and the
‘Property-Owning Democracy’’, Twentieth Century British History, 23 (2011), 2.
29 LSE, WSOC, Lord Shawcross, Appendix II, Chairman’s Address, minutes of the 1979
WSOC Annual General Meeting (19 June 1979), 2.
30 The second division, headed by Chairman Edgar Palamountain took the stock
market and the plight of the individual investor as its focus.
31 LSE, WSOC, George Copeman, ‘Employee Share Scheme Development in Britain’, in
Key Dates and Source Documents Relating to the Recent History of Employee Share Schemes
(unpublished), 2.
32 LSE, WSOC, George Copeman, ‘Profit Sharing in Perspective’, Personal Management
(January 1979).
33 LSE, WSOC, George Copeman, ‘The Chief Executive’s Master Contract; for Staff
Motivation and Reward’ (working title) (unpublished, undated), 5.
34 Andrew Pendleton, Employee Ownership, Participation and Governance: A study of
ESOPs in the UK (London, 2001), 3.
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or the mutual business model provided by the likes of John Lewis. The
Council’s intention was to protect, not undermine, a capitalist system and
its vision was intended to undercut, rather than support the solidaristic
vision of industrial democracy partly institutionalized in post-war
corporatism.
The Council’s belief in the importance of direct experiences of
ownership was derived from a belief that ownership had the potential
to transform the individual. In its 1960 launch publication—‘The
Growing Popularity of Share Ownership’—the Council predicted that
instalment payment systems and tax concessions would encourage
‘those who have no capital but . . . steady incomes to be shareholders
and thus become full participants in the workings of a free industrial
society’.35 It was felt that the spread of employee shareholding would
encourage ‘a new and increased sense of personal responsibility’ and so
help employees ‘to develop ‘‘the owner’s eye’’ . . . [and] begin to think
like owners’.36 For the WSOC the widening of direct share ownership
was not an end, but a means to an ‘enlightened’ capitalist society.
This understanding of share ownership as a transmutative experience
seemed to provide common ground with Conservative Party thought on
ownership, certainly as it was developing in the course of the 1950s and
1960s. As Matthew Francis suggests, during this period the
Conservatives were engaged in a consistent search for policies which
would broaden property ownership, particularly of industry. This, he
argues, offers an insight into the Party’s growing understanding that
ownership of capital assets could be part of a transformative project to
reshape popular attitudes to capitalism.37 The Council would have been
keenly aware of such debates, not least because of the role played in
them by members such as Edward du Cann. Nonetheless, despite these
mid-century intellectual explorations by the Party, there was a general
lack of political will to carry them out as thinking on the property-
owning democracy was dominated by home-ownership initiatives until
the late 1970s.38 Furthermore, there were many within the finance
industry who remained uninterested in popular share ownership on the
grounds that private investors presented an uneconomic prospect.
Discussing the reception he received during the late 1950s to the idea of
popularizing investment facilities with the ‘man on the street’, Edward
du Cann described his assumption that City leaders would find the
objective ‘immediately attractive’ as ‘hopelessly wrong’.39
35 Quoted in, ‘Britain Needs Wider Share Ownership’, Financial Times (23 February 1960).
36 Quoted in, ‘Help for Workers to Buy Shares: Case for Tax Concessions’, Birmingham
Post (23 February 1960).
37 Francis, ‘Not Too Many Capitalists, but Too Few’.
38 Francis, ‘Not Too Many Capitalists, but Too Few’.
39 Edward Du Cann, Two Lives: The Political and Business Careers of Edward Du Cann
(Worcester, 1995), 60–1.
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Consequently, the Council spent much of the 1960s and early 1970s
in the ‘doldrums’.40 It struggled to make any concrete progress in
advancing greater tax concessions for investment practices or employee
share schemes. If anything, moves towards wider share ownership
suffered legislative set-backs, including the extension of capital gains
tax to employee share option schemes by Heath’s Conservative
Government. However, with the arrival of Thatcher as leader of the
Conservative Party in 1975, there seemed reason for optimism that
Britain could become a nation of investors as the WSOC envisaged. The
rhetoric of popular capitalism and Thatcherite presentations of the
property owning democracy would have held a great deal of promise
for the Council. So too would the emergence of the One Nation and the
Bow Group. The Council’s insistence ‘that the establishment of a share
owning democracy will necessitate a large increase in the availability of
shares’ was complemented by the challenge Conservatives such as
Geoffrey Howe were mounting against the nationalizations of the
Labour governments.41 There is evidence that the Council even had
some success in representing to the Party as part of the similarly named
‘Wider Share Ownership Committee’ set up by Keith Joseph in 1975
under the chairmanship of David Howell. The Liberals too played a
part in encouraging the Council’s optimism in this period, by pushing
‘an unwilling [Labour] administration’ into offering tax concessions for
employee profit-sharing schemes under the 1978 Finance Act.42
The WSOC’s willingness to work closely with the Conservatives
under Thatcher is unsurprising. Several individuals on the Council
demonstrated especially right wing sympathies. Edward du Cann had
been a potential right-wing contender for the party leadership in 1975
before he declined to put himself forward for candidature, and several
other members of the council would go on to become ardent
Thatcherites. After abandoning early links with the Labour Party,
having been Attorney General under Attlee, the WSOC’s President,
Lord Shawcross, moved to the right during his time on the Council,
having resigned as a Labour MP in 1958. Although he joined the Social
Democrat Party in 1983, Shawcross demonstrated an obvious sympathy
towards the aims of Thatcher’s governments, writing in his memoirs
that ‘The extortions and impositions by the trade unions not only
blemished individual freedoms but helped to destroy British
40 Copeman, ‘Introduction’, An Illustrated History of the Wider Share Ownership Council, 2.
41 LSE, WSOC The Wider Share Ownership Council, Discussion Paper: The Crisis of
Capitalism in Britain and Corporate Governance (undated); Stedman Jones, Masters of the
Universe, 150.
42 CPA, PUB 108/23, Nicholas Goodison, ‘Shares for all: Steps Towards a Share-
Owning Democracy’, Centre for Policy Studies, Templeton Lecture (London, 1986), 8.
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competitiveness in world markets—a situation only recovered by
Margaret Thatcher’s courage and legislation’.43
These points of overlap demonstrate the complex nature of
Thatcherism in the financial domain, with different institutions at
different times driving forward change. For a short period of time in
the 1970s the WSOC acted as a source of support, although perhaps not
a vehicle for Thatcherism. Nonetheless, the Council would ultimately
find itself at odds with the more radical aspects of the Conservative
Party’s economic revolution and the interests its reforms served. In
particular the issue of direct and indirect capital ownership would
become the main point of departure between the Council and the form
that popular capitalism took in the hands of institutional purveyors of
individual investment products.
The WSOC’s loyalty to this element of its ideology was evident in its
reluctance to promote pension schemes and unit trusts as suitable forms of
investment for first-time investors, despite links to both these industries.
Unit trusts in particular were frequently advertised by financial institu-
tions as the most suitable investment vehicle for novice investors.44 They
were a less risky prospect which required less knowledge due to the
involvement of trust managers. However, they also represented form of
financial intermediation, occupying the space between the individual and
the direct ownership of capital. For the Council this was problematic,
reflecting an underlying struggle between the economic interest and
pragmatism of financial institutions on the one hand, and the WSOC’s
idealistic vision of individual ownership on the other.
In pushing the issue of direct ownership, the WSOC required the
public to become risk-assuming, active citizens, rather than risk-averse,
passive consumers. However, the complexity of financial products and
the high levels of risk associated with individual investment often made
institutional investment instruments more appealing. The Council thus
understood that it would have to compete with the interests of larger
financial institutions if it wanted to direct the path of wider share
ownership in Britain.
The WSOC and the City
In developing its intellectual agenda, the WSOC sat at an intriguing
intersection between different political traditions and interests.
43 Baron Hartley Shawcross, Life Sentence: The Memoirs of Lord Shawcross (London, 1995), 325.
44 Unit trusts are a form of collective investment which allow individual investors to
pool their money by buying units in a single fund. This pool of money is invested across
a range of investments by a fund manager. Profits are distributed based on how many
units each individual owns. Investor spread their risk without the need to invest in
several companies.
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However, in putting its vision into practice, the WSOC turned not to the
support of political parties, but to the institutions of the City of London,
from which many of its members were drawn. Exploring how the
Council sought to expand its sphere of influence offers a unique insight
into the material factors which acted as limitations on rival visions of
wider share ownership. It also draws our attention to the Council as a
type of peripheral pressure group not hitherto explored by historians in
any great detail, which lie outside of traditional narratives concerning
the rise of neoliberalism.
The plight of organized political lobbying by the financial commu-
nity in the twentieth century has been one marked by fracture rather
than unity.45 The 1960s proved to be a pivotal moment for the ways in
which the City managed its relationship with the government. As
David Kynaston suggests, there was a perceived ineffectiveness
attached to the Bank of England which by the end of the 1950s had
found itself increasingly ‘marginal to the ever-growing Whitehall
machine’.46 Various institutions began to move away from the Bank as a
voice of representation, instead operating beyond its established
domain of control.47 This is unsurprising given the diverse and
frequently divided nature of the financial sector. In line with its
growing role in its own political efficacy, the financial sector went
through a process of gradual professionalization across its various
sectors, with trade associations developing a degree of sophistication.48
The prominence of a creed of self-regulation in the City meant that the
role of these groups in regulating markets became indivisible from their
function in representing markets to the Bank of England.49
This political and institutional climate inherently shaped the
organizational structure of the WSOC which took on many of the
characteristics of trade associations. Several of its members were
simultaneously representatives of these groups, no doubt bringing their
experiences of trade association organization to their activities in the
WSOC. But despite appearances, the WSOC more accurately fits Wyn
Grant’s model of a peripheral ‘insider’ pressure group than a trade
association. These are groups recognized by government as a legitimate
45 Michael Moran, ‘Finance capital and pressure group politics in Britain’, British
Journal of Political Science, 11 (1981), 381.
46 David Kynaston, The City of London, Volume IV: A Club No More, 1945 – 2000, Pimlico
Edition (London, 2002), 247.
47 Moran, ‘Finance Capital and Pressure Group Politics in Britain’, 396.
48 Wyn Grant, Business and Politics in Britain (2nd edn, London, 1993), 78; Michael
Moran uses the term ‘meso-corporatism’ to define the key features of the City at this time:
‘the appropriation of a regulatory role by private interests; the transformation of private,
voluntary associations into authoritative bodies; the restriction of political and economic
competition’ (Michael Moran, The Politics of the Financial Services Revolution: The USA, UK
and Japan (London, 1991), 15).
49 Moran, ‘Finance Capital and Pressure Group Politics in Britain’, 387.
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voice for specific interests, and hence permitted to participate in formal
consultation processes, but which in reality enjoy little influence.50
Part of the problem was the continuing lack of interest in the
individual investor amongst large sections of the City. Divisions between
the Stock Exchange Council and its members attest to the extent of the
disagreement between the diverse interests of the City over the issue of
wider share ownership. In a 1971 Financial Times article discussing the
lack of enthusiasm of stockbrokers for the small investor, Kenneth
Gooding highlighted the irony of the situation given that ‘the activities of
the London Stock Exchange’s publicity department and the Wider Share
Ownership Council are all likely to produce the kind of business which
many brokers admit is loss-making’. He claimed that around half of the
Stock Exchange member broking firms were reluctant to even make their
names available to small investors.51 The problem was that smaller firms
were unable to justify their dealing expenses in the case of small
transactions, whilst larger London-based banks and insurance companies
were often unwilling ‘to pay higher charges . . . even if it did encourage
the private investor by subsidizing their buying and selling’.52
In the face of such disinterest, the Council relied on the prestige and
personal connections of many of its members to try and further its
ambitions in the City. In a pattern mirrored by its corporate
membership, the Council maintained a diverse committee, run as it
was by City figures, businessmen, financial journalists, and politicians.
For instance, Chairman Edgar Palamountain was also chairman of the
M&G group from 1977, and of the Unit Trust Association between 1977
and 1979. His successor, John Harvey-Jones, was also one-time
chairman of Imperial Chemical Industries. Yet, despite the influential
positions of such individuals, the WSOC persistently fails to receive as
much attention from decision makers, or to stimulate as much support
amongst financial institutions, as it might have wished. This was
reflected by its longstanding disappointment with the financial
restrictions placed upon its activities. The available accounts are
marked by a steady growth from humble balance of £217 in 1976 to
£31,622 in 1988. However, this failed to match the Council’s
expectations and Palamountain stated in 1983 that its ‘main problem’
since its founding in 1958 ‘has been, and continues to be, the problem
of attracting financial support’.53 The sense of frustration was palpable,
with Palamountain lamenting that
50 Grant, ‘Pressure Politics’, 408–9.
51 Kenneth Gooding, ‘Stockbrokers and the Size of Individual Deals’, Financial Times
(2 August 1971), 14.
52 Ranald C. Michie, The London Stock Exchange: A History (Oxford, 1999), 492–3.
53 LSE, WSOC, Edgar Palamountain, Appendix 1, Chairman’s Address, minutes of the
WSOC 1983 Annual General Meeting (29 June 1983), 1.
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[O]ur output, however praiseworthy in the circumstances, has
inevitably carried no great conviction. Neither the official establish-
ment nor the press give us the consideration we deserve. In short, we
have prestige, but we have no clout.54
Ben Jackson demonstrates that organizations such as the IEA and the
CPS relied on donations from business for operational success because
alternative sources of revenue (such as the sale of publications) did not
cover costs.55 Much the same can be said for the WSOC. Consequently,
its persistent struggle for funding must be seen as a reflection of a low
profile in the City and amongst businesses. As a measure of comparison
the IEA was able to rely on donations amounting to £76,574 in 1974 and
as much as £210,343 in 1979, dwarfing the paltry sums relied on by the
WSOC.
The Council’s failure to draw greater interest from the City was not
through lack of trying. It persistently pursued alternative ways of
increasing its influence in an attempt to place itself at the heart of wider
share ownership initiatives, notably through developing partnerships
with more powerful bodies. The latter half of the 1970s and the early
1980s saw the Council attempting to harness the forces around them in
order to direct the trajectory of wider share ownership as it came
increasingly to the forefront of the Conservative Party’s political
agenda. For instance in 1984 it was involved in extensive discussions
regarding the possibility of ‘strengthening the Council and enlarging its
activities’ through a merger with the Investor Relations Society.56 Given
the hopes that the merger would draw in £200,000 annual support from
the City there must have been much disappointment when this failed to
materialize, leading to its failure. Such schemes nevertheless reveal the
WSOC’s desire to network and draw support from sympathetic areas of
the finance industry in support of its campaign.
In addition to money, the Council also coveted more active and
consistent engagement from business and the City in the project for
wider share ownership. It focused no small effort on converting
companies to the idea of employee ownership as demonstrated by its
annual forum for companies interested in running profit-sharing
schemes. This was accompanied by the regular publishing of pamphlets
and guides with titles such as ‘Employee Share Schemes’, ‘The
Shareholder’s Rights and Responsibilities’, ‘Making your Money Work
54 LSE, WSOC, Edgar Palamountain, ‘Future of the Council: Memorandum by the
Chairman’ (21 August 1984), 1.
55 Jackson, ‘The think tank archipelago’, 46.
56 This was a membership organization established in 1980 to promote best practice
amongst financial institutions involved with investor relations. It was run by members
largely drawn from financial service providers, FTSE 100 companies and investor
relations advisers.
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for You’ and ‘Growth in a Responsible Society’.57 As the education of
the young was seen as of central importance for creating a nation of
informed share-owners, the Council also made several attempts to train
the nation in ‘money management’ from an early age. This included
various ventures towards founding a ‘Money Management Association’
to teach financial management in schools. In the course of this
endeavour the WSOC sought links with the Open University and The
National Savings Committee, thus offering a point of contact between
academia and financial trade associations.58
One area in which the WSOC did have some joy was in its
relationship with the London Stock Exchange Council. Although likely
one-sided, with the WSOC forming only a minor interest for the
London Stock Exchange Council, there are regular examples of the two
institutions working together on projects and events. Here the Council
relied largely on executive committee member, Stuart Valentine. A
former employee of the Economics Department at Midland Bank,
Valentine joined the London Stock Exchange in 1976. The value of this
connection was epitomized by the creation of a London Stock Exchange
‘Wider Share Ownership Unit’ in June 1986, under the guidance of
Valentine who was at that time head of the Public Affairs Department.
Its role was to ‘encourage, through the Stock Exchange, wider share
ownership and to help member firms market themselves effectively’.59
Despite these efforts, the Council’s vision of wider share ownership
based on employee share schemes proved difficult to translate into
concrete support from external institutions. This vision thus remained
tied to the fortunes of the WSOC. On the one hand, the willingness of
important figures to attach their name to the Council is indicative of a
well-connected organization. On the other hand, a distinct lack of
material denoting any meaningful communication with notable and
powerful groups suggests a failure to push beyond these immediate
networks and personal connections. This was nowhere more evident
than in the decreasing level of interest expressed by the Conservative
Party in the WSOC. After the Council’s perceived successes in working
with the Party in the mid-1970s, its relationship became increasingly
one-sided. The only record held by the Conservative Party of any
significant communication during the 1980s concerns a paper submitted
57 LSE, WSOC, The WSOC, Employee Share Schemes (The Riverhead Press, 1979); LSE,
WSOC, The WSOC, The Shareholder’s Rights and Responsibilities (The Riverhead Press,
1977); LSE, WSOC, Christopher Hill, Making your Money Work for You (The Riverhead
Press, undated); LSE, WSOC, The Wider Share Ownership Committee, Growth in a
Responsible Society (London, 1961).
58 LSE, WSOC, minutes of the WSOC Executive Committee meeting (21 September
1977); LSE, WSOC, minutes of the WSOC Executive Committee meeting (12 December
1977), 2.
59 LSE, WSOC, minutes of the WSOC Executive Committee meeting (20 October 1986), 3.
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by Copeman to the Prime Minister in 1981 on the subject of share
incentive schemes. Following a meeting between Copeman and officials
from the Treasury, Inland Revenue and the Department of Employment,
it was reported that Geoffrey Howe simply did ‘not find them
attractive’.60
Much the same can be said of the Council’s relationship with the
press. After a spate of interest during the early-1960s, when the Council
was at the forefront of the wider share ownership agenda, coverage of
its activities had swiftly waned. By the 1980s, infrequent reports on the
Council’s activities paled in comparison to the numbers of features
dedicated to the rapidly expanding numbers of products and services
on offer to new and small investors. In a decade headlined by popular
capitalism, privatizations, deregulation, and City scandals, the Council
found itself relegated to providing the odd quote on relevant issues.
This was both a symptom and a cause of the Council’s disillusionment
with its inability to shape the lines along which popular capitalism was
proceeding.
As it entered the 1980s, the Council had been optimistic about the
potential for a share-owning democracy to emerge under the auspices
of Thatcherism. However, it quickly became aware that its position was
not a strong one as it found itself increasingly excluded from decision-
making processes in Westminster. Despite numerous attempts to
establish links with more well-financed or influential groups in the
City, the Council was persistently inhibited in its activities by a lack of
funding. It remained only a small institution, something that had
negative implications for its vision of wider share ownership. Although
it had been a predominant and consistent voice in favour of wider
share ownership throughout the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s, as the 1980s
progressed it begun to fall out of favour as larger institutions took
centre stage in driving forward popular capitalism.
The ‘Big Bang’ and the Rise of ‘Parasitic Intermediation’
In the last few years of its life, the WSOC’s executive committee put
plans in motion to create a charity in the form of the Wider Share
Ownership Educational Trust (WSOET). In a 1987 outline of the
Council’s intentions on this front, it was stated that ‘while the
environment has undoubtedly changed dramatically in favour of wider
share ownership, an enormous amount remains to be done. Although
wider ownership is now wide, it is still very shallow’.61 This
60 Margaret Thatcher Foundation Website (hereafter MTFW, followed by [Unique
document ID], 124560, Letter from Peter Jenkins to Michael Scholar (19 February 1982).
61 LSE, WSOC, The WSOC, Future Policy (November 1987), 2.
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description referred to the changing patterns of ownership in Britain
during the 1980s. Levels of private shareholding had been in decline
since the mid-twentieth century, with individual ownership falling from
54 per cent of the total value of UK shares in 1963 to 37.5 per cent in
1975.62 Given the dramatic rise in the number of shareholders under
Thatcher (the number of investors rose from 3 million in 1980 to 11
million in 1991), it would be reasonable to expect this trend to be
reversed.63 However, as the Council feared, this represented a shallow
kind of ownership, with the total percentage of shares owned by
individuals continuing to fall, reaching just 21.3 per cent in 1989.64
Although there were now more shareowners, they collectively owned
less. As the 2012 Kay Review of UK equity markets suggested, this
declining function of individual shareholders was ‘paralleled by an
explosion of intermediation’ represented by the growing percentage of
equities owned by life assurance companies and unit trusts and notably
pension funds whose proportion of shares increased from 16.8 per cent
in 1975 to 31 per cent in 1989.65
In the face of these patterns of ownership, the Council proceeded in
laying out a series of new objectives for the WSOET. It wanted to
counter the rise of financial intermediation as reflected by calls to
‘promote and protect the interests of personal shareholders’.66 Thus
although the Council remained committed to spreading ‘enlightenment’
about share ownership through education, it also recognized that a new
relationship had developed between the financial services industry and
the private investor. It was clear that investing had come to be seen as a
form of asset management, with the result that financial products were
being sold as such. The creation of the WSOET thus represents the
plight of the WSOC in the mid- to late-1980s, and in particular the
disappointment that it had begun to experience with the realities of
popular capitalism. The changing role of the WSOC in this period
provides an in-depth exposition of the failed reconciliation between the
responsible consumption of shares and the forms ownership fuelled by
the forces of deregulation, privatization and the subsequent ways that
large financial conglomerates catered for the individual investor. In
particular its concept of ownership was undermined by the financial
products being provided and promoted by such institutions, which
62 Office for National Statistics (ONS), ‘Statistical Bulletin: Ownership of UK Quoted
Shares, 2012’ (25 September 2013), 12 <http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/dcp171778_327674.
pdf> accessed 12 July 2015.
63 Michie, The London Stock Exchange, 591.
64 ONS, ‘Statistical Bulletin’, 12.
65 ONS, ‘Statistical Bulletin’, 11; John Kay, The Kay review of UK Equity Markets and Long-
Term Decision Making (London, 2012), 30.
66 The WSOC, Future Policy, 2.
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tended to be designed specifically to minimize the required level of
financial knowledge by the individual.
Part of the problem was that despite the popularity of privatization
share offers (the sale of British Telecom (BT) in 1984 drew over 2 million
applications), shareholders frequently quickly offloaded their newly
acquired shares or failed to demonstrate a continued interest in
investing thereafter. As one contemporary commented, privatization
had ‘elevated stagging to something of a national sport’.67 However, the
Council’s main concern at this time related to the underlying issue of
investor ignorance. This was seen as problematic in a situation where
individuals were being integrated into a progressively information-
heavy relationship with the finance industry. Responsible share
ownership was meant to be built upon a foundation of investors who
were well-informed about the financial products they purchased.
Conversely, economics literature indicates the dangers of ‘information
asymmetries’ in which certain groups of investors ‘extract value from
the market’ to the detriment of less informed ones.68 Unsurprisingly, it is
small investors who are seen as more vulnerable to information
asymmetries at the hands of larger financial institutions, often having to
make decisions based on incomplete information, exposing themselves to
risk and jeopardizing their long-term financial security.69 There is no doubt
that the Council was aware of these potential dangers, and it felt that the
continued engagement of a new class of small investors depended ‘on the
confidence which the individual can place in the institutional frame-work
within which his savings are going to be handled’.70 Such reflection was
not unfounded, with the 2012 Kay Report indicating that one of the main
factors fuelling the growth of intermediation has been a ‘decline of trust
and confidence in the investment chain’.71
Lamenting that most small shareholders ‘simply have no contacts,
[and] no knowledge’, the Council envisaged itself more and more as an
advocate for individual and employee share-owners.72 It understood
that the ‘growing public apetite for financial news, an expected rapid
increase in the numbers of investment practitioners, of investment
67 J.T. Stafford, The Share-Owner’s Guide: How to Invest Profitably and Safely in Shares
(Cambridge, 1987), 75; Copeman, History; ‘The Future of the Wider Share Ownership
Council’ (c. June 1990), 1.
68 Information asymmetries are caused by the incomplete information that various
players involved in financial transactions might have about the true value of resources
and assets (J. A. Roels, Information Asymmetries and the Creation of Economic Value
(Amsterdam, 2010), 5, 48).
69 Mark Huberty, ‘Testing the Ownership Society: Ownership and Voting in Britain’,
Electoral Studies, 30 (2011), 792.
70 LSE, WSOC, Edgar Palamountain, Appendix I, Chairman’s Address, Minutes of the
1984 WSOC Annual General Meeting (25 June 1984), 2.
71 Kay, The Kay review, 30.
72 LSE, WSOC, ‘The Future of the Wider Share Ownership Council’ (c. June 1990), 1.
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products and of shareholders’ [sic] meant that it was now dealing with
share-owners who could be perceived as consumers of capital.73 These
consumers were encouraged to engage with capital ownership as a
means of assuming financial responsibility through the management of
their assets in the form of pensions, life insurance and investment. In a
memorandum to the Chancellor of the Exchequer in 1988, the Council
stated that this had ‘produced new challenges in the areas of education
and investor protection’.74 It thus began to act in the capacity of a small
investors’ consumer association—fielding complaints and advocating
on behalf of small investors.75 This progression in the Council’s identity
mirrors the changes being wrought by Thatcherism in the field of
personal finance more broadly; the more that capital was assigned the
role of a commodity to be consumed by the public, the more the WSOC
came to view itself as a consumer service.
As a result of this interest in consumer protection, at the moment when
the Thatcher administration was pursuing deregulation, the WSOC found
itself acting in opposition. It ‘welcomed’ the 1982 Gower report, which
called for a new Investors Protection Act.76 In doing so it claimed to have
‘dissented from the negative attitude which many City institutional bodies
adopted’ towards regulation due to fears that any intervening body could
pose a threat to profits.77 Of particular interest are the Council’s
discussions in its 1984 Annual general meeting (AGM). In keeping with
City traditions the WSOC called for the kind of self-regulation that had
characterized City practices throughout the twentieth century, but it also
asserted the need for a ‘master agency or self-regulatory body in the
securities industry’.78 Palamountain lamented that it was ‘sad to see the
Stock Exchange apparently embark on a course which seems to many of
us likely to prejudice the interests of the personal investor’.79
The Council rejected outright the proposed deregulation of the stock
market in 1986, which for the Conservatives was of central importance
for the realization of a free-market economic system. According to
Conservative rhetoric, the increased level of competition introduced
into the stock market through the abolition of fixed-rate commissions in
1986 would remove ‘the controls which hampered success’.80 In reality,
the deregulation of the financial sector provided the means for
73 LSE, WSOC, Outline Merger Proposals: The Wider Share Ownership Council and the
Investors Relations Society (March 1985), 2.
74 LSE, WSOC, The WSOC, Sustaining the Momentum (1988), 1.
75 LSE, WSOC, minutes of The WSOC Executive Committee meeting (20 October 1986), 4.
76 LSE, WSOC, The WSOC, ‘Comments on the Gower Report’ (Second Draft) (c.1982);
Palamountain, Chairman’s Address, 1984 WSOC AGM.
77 LSE, WSOC, The WSOC, ‘Comments on the Gower Report’.
78 LSE, WSOC, The WSOC, ‘Comments on the Gower Report’.
79 LSE, WSOC, The WSOC, ‘Comments on the Gower Report’.
80 MTFW, 106512, Margaret Thatcher, Speech at Lord Mayor’s Banquet (10 November 1986).
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institutions such as banks and building societies to insert themselves
into the middle of the relationship between the individual and the
ownership of capital. As Ranald Michie suggests, deregulation led to ‘a
sudden jockeying for position by outside finance houses, as they saw
opportunities to create integrated banking and broking operations in
London’.81 The removal of fixed commission rates led to rises in dealing
costs, rendering the cost of small investment relatively high and
uneconomical and the Council feared ‘an inferior service for the
individual investor . . . at a higher price’.82 It also maintained that the
removal of the jobbing system would eradicate ‘a major source of
protection for the investor’.83 It is for this reason that it made an
extended plea to the government to ensure the ‘better treatment of
private investors’ in 1988.84
The issue of investor protection was not the only way that financial
practices in the 1980s fell short of the WSOC’s idealistic vision of wider
share ownership. Part of its resistance was cultural, reflecting a struggle
for hegemony between a ‘new enterprise culture’ promoted by the
Conservative Party and an older ‘City Culture’ of gentlemanly
capitalism.85 This resistance is evident in Shawcross’ complaints that
‘When I started in the City, everyone accepted . . . the rule that ‘‘my
word is my bond’’. . . now . . . There is the ‘‘yuppie’’ phenomenon; there
have been the very grave scandals that have come to light’.86
Underlying this distaste for the changing dynamics and perceived
irresponsibility in the City, was a more fundamental disappointment in
the forms of ownership emerging at this time. The reality was that
people owned shares for a whole variety of reasons, many of which had
nothing to do with the desire to become ‘good’ capitalists. The
investment vehicles on offer to individual investors also transgressed
the WSOC’s desire to see direct share ownership. The majority of the
products created by new alliances of banks and brokers were simply
not designed to educate individuals in investment, but rather sought to
allow them to invest with minimal understanding of the stock market.
For instance, share shops opened in Debenhams stores by stockbroker
Quilter Goodison offered little in the way of instruction for the ‘Sids’
seeking to sell their privatization allocations, aside from the provision
81 Michie, The London Stock Exchange, 555.
82 LSE, WSOC, The WSOC, ‘Response to the Stock Exchange Discussion Paper’
(31 May 1984), 2.
83 LSE, WSOC, The WSOC, ‘Response to the Stock Exchange Discussion Paper’, 1.
84 WSOC, Sustaining the Momentum, 2.
85 Christopher Stanley, ‘Cultural Contradictions in the Legitimation of Market Practise:
Paradox in the Regulation of the City’, Leslie Budd and Sam Whimster, eds, Global Finance
and Urban Living: A Study of Metropolitan Change (London, 1992), 146.
86 LSE, WSOC, Lord Shawcross, Appendix II, President’s Address, Minutes of the 1988
WSOC Annual General Meeting (9 June 1988), 3.
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of a few in-store pamphlets.87 As a consultant who worked at the
launch of the share shop indicated, people ‘didn’t really quite
understand the concept of owning a part of a company and what
that gave you in terms of being able to vote at meetings and so on’.88 So
even as such services were lauded for their attempts at ‘dispelling the
mystique of shareholding’, the reality was that their raison d’etre had
little to do with educating the public in securities or engaging with
them as serious investors.89
Such products encouraged a model of consumer empowerment
which encouraged passive consumption and risk aversion.
Barclayshare, the share dealing service launched by Barclays in 1987
was promoted precisely on the basis that ‘You don’t have to be
accustomed to reading the Financial Times . . . to be a stock market
investor’.90 Associated marketing campaign literature lauded the
service’s provision of quick and easy dealing, simplified tax returns,
and minimal paperwork.91 This was not a form of ownership designed
to transform the individual into an active participant in industrial
democracy. The initial service offered by Barclayshare enabled people
investing in Personal Equity Plans92 to do so simply by ‘transferring
money from your Barclays account to your Barclayshare account’,
promising that ‘Barclayshare will look after the rest’.93 This service
included a discretionary managed portfolio, meaning that investment
decisions were made by managers. Aside from paying the annual
management fee and other associated costs, the individual was more or
less uninvolved, not even required to complete paperwork or keep
share certificates.
Financial institutions such as these worked to minimize the input of
the individual investor, channelling their savings into institutional
hands instead. The desire of individuals to purchase these services
perhaps reflected a recognition that information asymmetries came at
the expense of the private investor. Nevertheless, for the WSOC the rise
in such intermediation was seen as one of the major disappointments of
87 Interview with Robert Hodge, Birmingham (29 September 2014).
88 Interview with Robert Hodge, Birmingham.
89 Richard Wainwright, cited in, A. Hamilton, ‘Soft Selling Shares beyond the Lingerie
Counter’, The Times (10 September 1985), front cover.
90 Manchester, Barclays Group Archive (hereafter BGA), HC 13 A/ 3/ 1, ‘Share
Ownership Made Easy with Barclayshare’ Brochure (undated).
91 BGA, HC 107/3, Barclays Financial Services Co-ordinated Campaign No. 3 (21st
March 1988 to 29th April 1988); BGA, 1318/7690 ‘Unit Trusts: How to become a Stock
Market Investor for £500 or £20 a Month’ Brochure (January 1986), 1.
92 PEPs were first announced in the 1986 budget as a tax-privileged account to
encourage wider share ownership and could include collective fund investment
instruments such as unit trusts.
93 Richard Thomson, ‘Family Money: Banks set to Jump on the Bandwagon’, The Times
(2 August 1986).
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its campaign. It deplored the occurrence of ‘substantial institutional
control over the financial assets of the personal sector’.94 Copeman
surmised that although privatization had precipitated the rapid increase
of private shareholders, the ‘cult of the equity for employee pension
funds, led by Mr Ross Goobey of the Prudential . . . also won’.95 This
was because the rise to 2.25 million employee shareholders since the
WSOC’s creation in 1958 had been dwarfed by a much larger
movement of employee pension money into equities.96 The struggle to
win the private investor away from institutional investment and to
create an equal legislative footing for direct investment would remain
an aim of the Council until its dissolution. Former council member and
one-time chief executive of Barclayshare, Gavin Oldham, lamented
some of the negative outcomes of the Big Bang:
‘Anyone who is interested in providing the most direct link possible
between people in a community and the businesses which drive the
economy . . . want to make that intermediation process as efficient
and slim-lined as possible . . . [I]f you are genuinely interested in
retail stockbroking, then you are passionate about disintermediation,
about trying to cut down that middle process . . . [T]he Big Bang
process itself, in my view, was one of the key ingredients behind
building up intermediation to a really parasitic level.’97
This undoubtedly refers to the ability of large financial institutions to
occupy the gap between the individual and the direct ownership of
shares, thus undermining a trajectory of wider ownership based on
enfranchising individuals in the economic life of the nation.
Such issues were also recognized by some in the Conservative Party.
In a CPS pamphlet, Nigel Vinson (Chairman of the Wider Ownership
Group) wrote,
[G]iving pension funds tax exempt status has led to the greatest shift
of ownership from individuals to institutions since the opposite
happened at the time of the Dissolution of the Monasteries . . . it runs
clean contrary to a fundamental principle of Tory philosophy, namely
that the diffusion of economic power, and the multiple sources of
patronage which flow from it, are prerequisites of a free society.98
94 LSE, WSOC, George Copeman, A Third of a Century of Wider Share Ownership’
(Unpublished), 4.
95 Copeman, A Third of a Century of Wider Share Ownership, 1.
96 LSE, WSOC, George Copeman, ‘The Wider Share Ownership Council and Corporate
Governance’, Speech (13 January 1992).
97 Interview with Gavin Oldham, former WSOC member and current Executive
Director of Share PLC, Aylesbury (2 October 2014).
98 CPA, PUB 109/20, Nigel Vinson, ‘Foreword’, Philip Chappell, Pensions and Privilege:
How to End the Scandal, Simplify Taxes and Widen Ownership, CPS Policy Study, 96 (Surrey,
1988), 5.
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Similarly, writing in 1986, David Howell challenged the ‘rhetoricians’
of the Party to pursue ‘decisive measures’ to promote the ‘truly
capitalist revolution’. By this he meant to critique the ‘dominance’ of
financial institutions, calling for an equalization of the fiscal advantages
between institutions and individual savers.99 Howell saw this as vital if
‘popular ownership and a significant spread of economic power really
are the social aims in our society’, perhaps suggesting that at that
moment—at the height of popular capitalism—they did not appear to
be.100 Thus even within the Conservative Party there were those who
became uncomfortable with the patterns of ownership that had arrived
alongside deregulation. Thatcherism it appeared was about financial
capitalism not consumer capitalism and so it failed to create cultural
change. As the result of institutional struggle over the provision of
services to the private investor, it was predicated on economic
reorganization in the interest of large investment firms rather than in
the interest of a shareholder democracy.
Conclusion
Popular capitalism ought to have been the perfect companion to the
WSOC’s ambitions to broaden the basis of share ownership in Britain.
Instead it caused an increasing distance between the Council and those
groups to whom it had previously aligned itself. Popular capitalism, in
other words, became a problem, at least as far as the WSOC was
concerned.
Understood as a defence of interests, rather than as a uniquely
ideological undertaking intended to broaden the basis of ownership
amongst the British public, it is clear that the Council acted not as a
vehicle for Thatcherism, but as a counterpoint to it. By the late 1980s, it
was clear that its vision of wider share ownership no longer matched
the reality created by the political and institutional reforms of the
decade. Within this context, it continued to make the diffusion of capital
about ‘little people’, adopting a defensive position based around the
protection of investor rights. It sought to advocate on their behalf in
order that privatization would fulfil its claims to enfranchise the nation
in the economic life of the country. This reflected a recognition that such
policies, when combined with the profit-driven rather than ideological
motives of the financial services sector, would damage, not bolster, the
vision of popular capitalism outlined in Conservative Party rhetoric. For
the Council, its ideological conviction meant that it ended the decade
99 David Howell, Blind Victory: A Study in Income, Wealth and Power (London, 1986), 127.
100 Howell, Blind Victory, 127.
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planning a merger with government and business-backed organization,
Proshare. It was subsumed into the establishment, and with its
dissolution in 1992, the Council’s vision of a share-owning democracy
underpinned by extensive employee share ownership died.
The WSOC brings into focus the importance of individual share-
ownership as a site of political, ideological and institutional contest-
ation, the outcome of which was by no means inevitable. Its
institutional narrative exposes the shift in understandings of capital
ownership away from a form of industrial democracy and towards
individualized financial asset management. This shift was ultimately
moulded by the consolidation of patterns of wider share ownership
which, rather than encouraging mass democratic participation in British
industry and business (either through employee share ownership or
widespread active and informed investment by new classes of
individuals), was predicated on uninitiated investment in institutional
investment instruments. Through this lens, Thatcherism appears less
the result of a coherent ideological project, and more the outcome of
institutional competition in which political reform was used to advance
specific economic interests.
In particular, this case study has implications for how historians
perceive consumer society in the 1980s. The ‘parasitic intermediation’
which developed in the financial services industry in the 1980s belied
any ideological endeavour to encourage a cultural shift in British
society based on the premise of a ‘share owning democracy’. The
consumer of financial services instead became increasingly inhibited by
the range of products on offer from a small but dominant group of
financial conglomerates. Thatcherism entailed the rise of an economic
form of consumption, governed not by consumer demands, but rather
by the designs of an institutional elite.
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